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T

he bipartisan tax reform bill recently introduced
by Sens. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and Judd Gregg,
R-N.H., proposes to abolish IRC section 911.1 That
section, which exempts U.S. citizens living overseas
from tax on the first $80,000 of earned income, is indeed anomalous in the context of a tax on all income
‘‘from whatever source derived,’’ and has been subjected to criticism.2 However, there is a reason section
911 has been in the code since the 1920s: In its absence, citizenship-based taxation becomes completely
unadministrable. Rather than continuing the long argument over section 911, Congress should therefore reexamine the basic premise: Should the U.S. continue to
tax its citizens who live permanently overseas?3
In my opinion, the answer is no. The U.S. is the
only country in the world to base worldwide taxation

1
Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010 (S.
3018), section 114 (proposed IRC section 7875(9), terminating
section 911 after Dec. 31, 2010). For S. 3018, see Doc 2010-3973
or 2010 TNT 36-47.
2
See, e.g., Walter A. Slowinski and B. John Williams Jr., ‘‘The
Formative Years of the Foreign Source Earned Income Exclusion: Section 911,’’ 51 Taxes 355 (1973); Philip F. Postlewaite
and Gregory E. Stern, ‘‘Innocents Abroad? The 1978 Foreign
Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Repeal,’’ 65 Va. L. Rev.
1093 (1979); Renee Judith Sobel, ‘‘United States Taxation of Its
Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity,’’ 38 Vand. L. Rev. 101
(1985).
3
For recent articles arguing in favor of retaining the current
tax on the basis of citizenship, see Michael Kirsch, ‘‘Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy,’’ 82 NYU L. Rev. 443 (2007); Edward
A. Zelinsky, ‘‘Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: Citizenship
as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile,’’ unpublished ms.
(2010). For an argument on the other side on administrability
grounds, see Cynthia Blum and Paula N. Singer, ‘‘A Coherent
Policy Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals,’’ 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 705 (2008).
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solely on citizenship.4 Historically, this rule was created
at a time when the income tax applied only to the rich
and when some of the rich moved overseas to avoid
the draft. We do not have a draft any more, the income
tax applies to the middle class, and many more U.S.
citizens live permanently overseas for nontax reasons.
In a globalized world, citizenship-based taxation is an
anachronism that should be abandoned.
There are three arguments that can be made in favor
of taxing citizens living permanently overseas, but all
of them are weak. The benefits argument is that U.S.
citizenship by itself confers benefits that justify taxation. But those benefits cannot be compared to the benefits derived from living in the United States, and are
identical to the benefits provided by other countries
that do not tax their citizens living overseas.
The ability-to-pay argument is that U.S. citizens are
part of a community and should contribute their fair
share to the pool of income that is redistributed across
the community. But we must in practice give the country of residence the primary right to tax nonresident
citizens, and therefore their income is mostly not available for us to redistribute.
The administrability argument is that citizenship is
an administrable proxy for domicile. But it is a very
imperfect proxy, and we already have an administrable

4

Eritrea is sometimes mentioned as another one, but it is unclear that it actually taxes nonresident citizens. The Philippines
used to tax nonresident citizens until 1995, but no longer does
so. See Kirsch, supra note 3; Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘‘Review of the Present-law Tax and Immigration Treatment of Relinquishment of Citizenship and Termination of Long-Term
Residency,’’ JCS-2-03, p. 79 (Feb. 2003), Doc 2003-3954, 2003
WTD 31-18.
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The rest of this article develops these points in
greater detail. Section I discusses the history of
citizenship-based taxation and shows that it is rooted
in a very different era than today, when residency imposed greater obligations and taxation was limited to
the rich and when relatively few U.S. citizens lived
overseas. Section II addresses the benefits argument
and concludes that the benefits of U.S. citizenship do
not justify worldwide taxation. Section III raises the
ability-to-pay argument and shows that it is a weak
basis for citizenship-based taxation. Section IV discusses the administrability issues and argues that they
strongly support repeal of citizenship-based taxation.
Section V concludes by arguing that in the era of
globalization, citizenship-based taxation is an anomaly
that should be abandoned, and explains some of the
simplification potential that results.5

I. History
Citizenship-based taxation of Americans living overseas began during the Civil War. The original Civil
War income tax from 1861 was imposed only on residents and on the U.S.-source income of nonresident
citizens.6 The tax on nonresident citizens was imposed
at a higher rate and with no exemption amount.7 In
1864, the tax was amended to apply to the income of
‘‘every person residing in the United States, or of any
citizen of the United States residing abroad,’’ regardless of whether the income arose ‘‘in the United States
or elsewhere.’’8 The application of the U.S. tax to citizens living overseas continued until the Civil War income tax expired in 1872, was revived in the aborted
income tax of 1894, and finally was incorporated into
the ‘‘modern’’ income tax of 1913.9
What was the rationale of taxing citizens living
overseas? The original enactors of the provision must
have known it would be very difficult to enforce, and
in fact negligible tax was collected even from the U.S.-

5

I do not discuss arguments based on efficiency or neutrality
because:
• they cut both ways — neutrality is violated when tax
influences either the decision to move overseas or the
decision to abandon U.S. citizenship; and
• in the case of individuals I believe the decision to move
is usually motivated primarily by nontax considerations.
See Kirsch, supra note 3.
6
Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, sec. 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309.
7
Id.
8
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, sec. 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281.
9
Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, sec. 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553;
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, sec. II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166.
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source income of citizens living overseas during the
Civil War.10 The application of tax to citizens living
overseas was a symbolic gesture: At a time of severe
national crisis, when citizens living in the U.S. were
expected not just to pay tax but also to serve in the
military and potentially die for their country (or at
least pay for a substitute), the perception of rich citizens living overseas was too much for Congress to
bear. As stated by a senator who served as a manager
in the conference committee that adopted the 1861 tax
law (taxing nonresident citizens at a higher rate):
We do not desire that our citizens who have incomes in this country . . . should go out of the
country, reside in Paris or elsewhere, avoiding the
risk of being drafted or contributing anything personally to the requirements of the country at this
time, and get off with as low a tax as everybody
else . . . If a man draws his income from our public debt, or from property here, and resides in
Paris, skulking away from contributing his personal support to the Government in this day of
its extremity, he ought to pay a higher income
tax.11

Citizenship-based taxation
is in practice
unadministrable and will
become even more so if
section 911 is repealed.
The same rhetoric was eventually applied to taxing
nonresident citizens on their worldwide income. Sen.
George Hoar stated in 1894 that:
There are a great many people, I am sorry to say,
who go abroad for that very purpose [of avoiding
tax], and some of them went abroad during the
late [Civil War]. They lived in luxury, at the same
time at less cost, in a foreign capital; they had
none of the voluntary obligations which rest
upon citizens, of charity, or contributions, or supporting churches, or anything of that sort, and
they escaped taxation.12
The origin of U.S. taxation of nonresident citizens
should thus be understood as stemming from a period
in which only the rich paid the income tax (the $800

10

Kirsch, supra note 3, footnote 32 (from 1863 to 1865 U.S.
citizens living overseas paid $230,470 of $84,015,918 of income
tax collected, or 0.003 percent).
11
Kirsch, supra note 3, at 451.
12
Id. at 453.
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basis for residence-based taxation in the physical presence rule. Citizenship-based taxation, on the other
hand, is in practice unadministrable and will become
even more so if section 911 is repealed.
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In 1924, the Supreme Court upheld the taxation of
nonresident citizens in Cook v. Tait.13 The case involved
a native citizen of the U.S. who lived permanently in
Mexico and derived his income from real and personal
property located in Mexico. The taxpayer argued that
the U.S. lacked jurisdiction to tax because both residence jurisdiction and source jurisdiction were lacking.
The Court rejected the argument because:
[T]he foundation of [plaintiff’s argument] is the
fact that the citizen receiving the income, and the
property of which it is the product, are outside of
the territorial limits of the United States. These
two facts, the contention is, exclude the existence
of the power to tax. Or to put the contention another way, as to the existence of the power and
its exercise, the person receiving the income, and
the property from which he receives it, must both
be within the territorial limits of the United
States to be within the taxing power of the
United States. The contention is not justified. . . .
In United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, the power
of the United States to tax a foreign built yacht
owned and used during the taxing period outside
of the United States by a citizen domiciled in the
United States was sustained.14
This analysis is of course fatally flawed: The plaintiff did not argue that ‘‘both’’ residence and source jurisdiction must apply for the U.S. to have jurisdiction to
tax; he argued that either one or the other must exist.
Moreover, the case relied upon by the Court supports
the taxation of residents on foreign-source income, not
the taxation of nonresident citizens. But the Court upheld the power to tax nonresident citizens because of
the benefits provided them by the U.S. government:
‘‘the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen

13

265 U.S. 47 (1924).
265 U.S. 55.

14
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and his property wherever found and, therefore, has
the power to make the benefit complete’’ by taxing the
nonresident citizen.15
Cook v. Tait permits Congress to tax nonresident citizens, but does not require it to do so. The history of
U.S. taxation of nonresident citizens is a dubious basis
from which to argue, as Prof. Kirsch does, that the
practice should continue.16 The application of the income tax to nonresident citizens stemmed from a great
national crisis in which resident citizens were expected
not just to pay tax but also to risk their lives for their
country. At the same time, nonresident citizens were
likely to be few in number, rich (or else they would not
be subject to tax), and suspected of living overseas to
avoid both the draft and the tax.
None of these conditions apply today. The U.S. is
not in crisis, there is no draft, and hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens live permanently overseas for
reasons that have nothing to do with taxation.17 In
many cases, they are citizens merely because they were
born here, have left the country when they were young,
and are blissfully unaware of their tax obligations. In
many more cases, they choose or are assigned to live
overseas because of the opportunities of globalization.
Under these 21st-century circumstances, do we still
have a good reason for taxing citizens living permanently overseas?
Kirsch argues that the answer is yes because of the
benefits afforded nonresident citizens by virtue of their
citizenship, and because citizens are part of a community and should be subjected to tax on ability-to-pay
grounds.18 Prof. Zelinsky rejects these arguments but
argues that citizenship is an administrable proxy for
domicile, which justifies taxation.19 In the next three
sections I will argue that none of these reasons for taxing nonresident citizens are persuasive.

15

265 U.S. 56.
Kirsch, supra note 3.
17
We have no idea how many U.S. citizens live overseas. The
GAO conducted an experimental study of expatriate population
in three randomly selected countries in 2004 in an attempt to
start counting expatriates in the 2010 census, and concluded that
it ‘‘would not be cost effective’’ to do so; it refers to the Census
Bureau’s acknowledgment that currently ‘‘no accurate estimate
exists’’ on the number of Americans abroad. The several reports
to Congress by the Census Bureau and the GAO on this issue do
not even attempt to give a range or an estimate of the number of
Americans overseas. See U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives, ‘‘2010 Census
— Counting Americans Overseas as Part of the Decennial Census Would Not Be Cost-Effective,’’ GAO-04-898 (Aug. 2004).
18
Kirsch, supra note 3.
19
Zelinsky, supra note 3.
16
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exemption excluded the vast majority of resident citizens), against the background of the most severe crisis
in the history of the country, and at a time when resident citizens could be drafted and when the likelihood
of dying in the service of our country was the highest
it has ever been in the history of the United States. In
that context, it is understandable that Congress would
want to appear to impose an equal tax burden on resident and nonresident citizens, since the nonresident
citizens were few in number and likely to be residing
overseas for the purpose of avoiding both the draft and
the tax. As Hoar implicitly acknowledged, there was in
practice no hope of collecting tax from nonresident
citizens, and ‘‘they escaped taxation’’ even though the
tax nominally applied to them.
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Kirsch lists the following benefits accorded to nonresident citizens: personal protection, property protection, right to vote, right to enter, and past benefits.20
As Zelinsky observes, none of these benefits seems
sufficient to justify taxation.21 The protection afforded
by the U.S. to its nonresident citizens and their property is rarely invoked and when it is invoked is frequently ineffective. For example, as shown by recent
Supreme Court cases involving foreign citizens on
death row, the right to consular assistance when a citizen is accused of a crime in a foreign country is frequently not used at all or used too late to be effective.
The right to vote argument is upside down. It is legitimate to argue that nonresident citizens must be
given the right to vote because they are subject to U.S.
tax, although even that ‘‘no taxation without representation’’ tradition is sometimes ignored (just ask D.C.
residents and resident aliens). But it does not follow
that because nonresident citizens vote they must be
taxed. Moreover, many countries do not allow nonresident citizens to vote because they do not fully bear the
consequences of their votes, and it would be legitimate
for the U.S. to follow that route if it stopped taxing
nonresident citizens, as it does for residents of Puerto
Rico.22
The right to enter is a tenuous basis for taxation.
Having U.S. citizenship overseas does give you the
peace of mind that you can enter the U.S. at any time,
but before it is exercised this option seems a weak basis
for such a heavy price as worldwide taxation. It is true
that many nonresident aliens would like to obtain U.S.
citizenship, and worldwide taxation can be seen as a
‘‘price’’ to be paid for it, but that is because they want
to live and work in the U.S., not because of citizenship
per se.
Finally, even Kirsch acknowledges that the past benefit argument is weak. Nonresident citizens may or
may not have received benefits from the U.S. while living there; in many cases they left at too young an age
to receive significant benefits, and in other cases they
lived in the U.S. long enough to pay tax for their benefits.
To see why the benefits argument for taxing nonresident citizens is wrong, one should compare the benefits
conferred by citizenship to the benefits conferred by

20

Kirsch, supra note 3.
Zelinsky, supra note 3.
22
The United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, Israel, India,
Chile, and Greece are among the democratic countries that do
not allow most nonresident citizens to vote, while Canada only
allows them to do so if their nonresident status has lasted for
five years or less. See http://aceproject.org/epic-en/
CDTable?question=VO004.
21
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residency to U.S. residents. The latter are much more
significant. U.S. residents benefit from first-class government protection, the rule of law, an outstanding
educational system, and the many opportunities of a
free market economy. These benefits are the reason the
U.S. is still the top choice of immigrants from other
countries, and they are all paid for by tax dollars. Nonresident citizens do not receive these benefits or at best
receive them in a much weaker form.
The benefits conferred by the government on residents are a major argument in favor of taxing them on
worldwide income, whether they are citizens or not. In
recent years, there have been abundant instances of
U.S. residents evading tax by hiding their money overseas. Why is that wrong? It is wrong because U.S. residents live in a democracy and vote for a certain level
of taxation and the benefits that ensue. They do not
choose to live in the Cayman Islands and to receive the
benefits commensurate with that country’s level of
taxation. As long as U.S. residents choose to live in the
U.S., they should pay tax on their worldwide income,
because that tax supports the benefits they receive. If
they choose to live permanently elsewhere, they receive
far fewer benefits and should not have to pay tax on
foreign-source income.

As long as U.S. residents
choose to live in the U.S.,
they should pay tax on
their worldwide income,
because that tax supports
the benefits they receive.
Finally, the same benefits cited by Kirsch as supporting taxation of nonresident citizens (protection of self
and property, right to vote, right to enter, past benefits)
are also afforded to nonresident citizens by every other
major democracy, and yet no other country taxes its
nonresident citizens. It is hard to argue that the protections of U.S. citizenship are significantly more valuable
than those of EU or Swiss citizenship — in fact, in
many places carrying a U.S. passport is more burdensome (because of visa requirements) and potentially
more dangerous than an EU or Swiss passport. If the
other democracies do not impose worldwide taxation
on their nonresident citizens because of the benefits
they provide, it is unclear why we should exact such a
high price for our benefits.
Many nonresident citizens hold or can easily obtain
a foreign passport, and the consequence of taxing them
differently than other advanced democracies is an incentive to abandon their U.S. citizenship. The result
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II. The Benefits Argument
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III. The Ability-to-Pay Argument
Taxation of U.S. residents on worldwide income is
justified on ability-to-pay grounds. Horizontal equity
requires equal taxation of a person earning $100 in
U.S.-source wages and a person earning $100 in
foreign-source interest income, and vertical equity requires higher taxation of a person earning $100 in
U.S.-source wages and $100 in foreign-source interest
income than a person earning only $100 in U.S.-source
wages.
Ability-to-pay taxation is justified as a way to support the government with the least sacrifice (because of
the declining marginal utility of money) and as a way
of achieving redistribution. But justifying the progressive income tax on ability-to-pay grounds does not answer the question, whose ability to pay should be taken
into account?
The ability-to-pay argument for taxing nonresident
citizens is that they are part of a community with resident U.S. citizens and therefore should share in the tax
burden imposed on that community. This argument
could be appealing if we only taxed citizens. But of
course we, like every other country, also tax resident
aliens, even though they do not vote, because they are
a part of the relevant community. If we taxed only on
the basis of citizenship, the U.S. would be full of
former citizens carrying passports of other countries
but living permanently in the U.S.
Moreover, we are not truly able to tax citizens living
overseas on an ability-to-pay basis. In the case of the
poorer ones, in many instances we do not even know
they exist, and they may not know that they are citizens — hence the inability to count them in the decennial census.24 In the case of most of the richer ones,
we need to concede the primary right to tax them to
their country of residence (which gets the ‘‘first bite at
the apple’’) and to either exempt their income from
taxation or grant a foreign tax credit. Thus, their income is not available to be taxed by us because it has
already been taxed by another country. We should not
base a broad rule such as ability-to-pay taxation of

23
IRC section 877, recently supplemented by the more effective IRC section 877A. Despite these provisions, an increasing
number of citizens expatriate. See Helena Bachmann, ‘‘Why
Most U.S. Expatriates Are Turning In Their Passports,’’ Time
Magazine, Apr. 20, 2010.
24
GAO report, supra note 17.
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nonresident citizens on the relatively few cases of citizens living overseas in countries that have no or low
income taxes.

IV. The Administrability Argument
Zelinsky, after acknowledging that the traditional
benefits and ability-to-pay rationales for taxing nonresident citizens are weak, advances a new and ingenious
argument: Citizenship is an administrable proxy for
domicile.25
It is true that many countries base their worldwide
tax on residents in part on fiscal domicile. Domicile is
a standard, not a rule, and is embodied in the tax treaties (including U.S. tax treaties) as a tiebreaker in cases
of dual residency.26 As defined in the treaties, domicile
requires the weighing of several factors, including
where the taxpayer’s ‘‘permanent home’’ is, her ‘‘habitual abode,’’ her ‘‘centre of vital interests,’’ and her
‘‘nationality.’’ Except for nationality (citizenship), all of
these terms are not defined and tax administrations
take different approaches to defining them.
Zelinsky correctly notes that the fiscal domicile
standard is hard to administer, and in fact the U.S.
abandoned this standard in its federal law in 1984 and
replaced it with a physical presence rule (discussed below). But his suggestion that citizenship be used as a
proxy for domicile is misplaced, because it is so clearly
overbroad.
For citizens who are U.S. residents, there is no need
to base taxation on citizenship because they would be
taxed on worldwide income as residents. For nonresident citizens, citizenship is a poor proxy for domicile
because so many of them live permanently overseas
and do not have any of the other indicia of U.S. domicile other than citizenship. At the extreme, citizenshipbased taxation applies to someone who was born in
the U.S. but has no other U.S. connections at all and
may even be unaware that he is a U.S. citizen.
If we are looking for an administrable definition of
residency, we already have one in the physical presence
test. Unlike corporations, individuals cannot be in
more than one place at the same time, and therefore
we and every other country base residency on physical
presence, which is easily monitored using entry and
exit records. With some exceptions, any individual who
is physically present in the U.S. for over half a year
(183 days) is subject to worldwide taxation regardless
of citizenship status.
The argument against basing residency solely on
physical presence is that it encourages individuals to
‘‘count days’’ and maintain their permanent home in
the U.S. while being absent for enough days to escape

25

Zelinsky, supra note 3.
See U.S. model, article 4 (2006).

26
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has been a long series of enactments designed to penalize tax-motivated expatriation, which have generally
been ineffective.23 As discussed below, abandoning
taxation of nonresident citizens could lead to significant simplification and reduction of administrative
costs, which probably exceed the revenue collected
from nonresident citizens.
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In fact, administrability is perhaps the strongest argument for not taxing nonresident citizens. Imagine for
a moment that section 911 is repealed (as Wyden,
Gregg, and many critics have advocated). In that case
every U.S. citizen living permanently overseas would in
theory be subject to full tax on the first dollar of income, and would need to claim the foreign tax credit
(if applicable) to prevent dual taxation.
Even with the current resources of the IRS, the only
nonresident citizens we are likely to tax in this scenario
are temporary expatriates working for U.S. multinationals. In other cases, the only way to administer the
tax is to condition the renewal of U.S. passports on
reporting the tax ID number to the IRS so they can
check if returns have been filed. This system works in
many cases today because section 911 ensures that
many nonresident citizens do not owe any U.S. tax and
are therefore willing to file returns. If they had to actually pay tax, many of them might simply forgo renewing their U.S. passports, since they usually have other
passports as well. I doubt the IRS could catch most of
them under that scenario. A law that cannot be enforced is a bad law.
As a practical matter, taxing nonresident citizens is
possible because:
• some of them work for large U.S. employers who
aid the IRS in enforcing the tax; and
• most others do not owe any U.S. tax because of
section 911.
Although there are no data I am aware of, I am
doubtful we collect much tax from nonresident citizens
living permanently overseas.27 The cost of what we do
collect is used to administer section 911, a complex
provision that imposes significant transaction costs on
both taxpayers and the IRS.
As Blum and Singer have argued, the taxation of
nonresident citizens is unadministrable.28 Attempting to
tax them, today as in 1864, imposes a burden on the
IRS that it is unable to meet. The result is a statute
that is not complied with in a large number of cases,
that imposes heavy transaction costs on those taxpayers
that do comply, and that is saved from being ignored
by a complicated provision (IRC section 911) that

27

See JCT report, supra note 4.
Blum and Singer, supra note 3.

28
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could be drastically simplified or abandoned if we did
not tax nonresident citizens.

V. Conclusion
Taxation of nonresident citizens is a relic of the
past that is ripe for abandonment. Historically, it stems
from the outrage felt during the Civil War at draft
dodgers. It has been with us ever since, even though we
no longer have a draft, and even though no other country in the world (with the possible exception of Eritrea)
taxes nonresident citizens. The only way we can maintain the fiction that we actually tax most of our nonresident citizens is by enacting complicated credit and
exclusion provisions that are difficult to administer and
are frequently ignored in practice. For someone who
acquired U.S. citizenship by being born here and has
lived almost his entire life overseas, filing tax returns
and complying with sections 901 and 911 must be a
highly unlikely proposition even if no tax burden
would likely result.
If we did not tax nonresident citizens, we could
abolish section 911. We could also abolish IRC section
877, which has proven ineffective in deterring taxmotivated expatriations, and simply apply the new IRC
section 877A (the exit tax on expatriation) to individuals abandoning U.S. residency, like most countries do.
Finally, we could give up on the ‘‘savings clause’’ in
our tax treaties, which we insist upon to enable us to
tax nonresident citizens but that we may well have to
pay a price for in treaty negotiations.
None of the traditional arguments for taxing nonresident citizens are persuasive. The benefits provided
to nonresident citizens are much weaker than the benefits provided to residents (whether citizens or aliens)
and are identical to the benefits provided by other
countries that do not tax nonresident citizens. The
ability-to-pay argument fails because we need to concede primary taxing jurisdiction to the residence country, so that most of the income of nonresident citizens
is unavailable for redistribution. And the administrability argument goes in the opposite direction: Taxation
of nonresident citizens is both unadministrable in
many cases and in others imposes heavy transaction
costs. Finally, abandoning taxation of nonresident citizens could lead to significant simplification benefits.
The main reason we continue to tax nonresident
citizens is history — it’s a tradition that is 150 years
old, and a significant part of American tax exceptionalism. But just as we joined the rest of the world in
adopting corporate-shareholder integration, it is time
for us to relinquish this part of our history and update
our taxation to fit the globalized world of the 21st century, in which more and more U.S. citizens should be
able to move overseas in pursuit of economic opportunity without being incentivized to relinquish their citizenship.
◆
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worldwide taxation. Therefore, we also count days in
previous years, so that it is not possible to be in the
U.S. 182 days in every year and avoid residency status.
Because physical presence is perfectly administrable,
administrability is not an argument for taxing nonresident citizens.

